Mobile Groups in the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Challenges in Ensuring Operational Effectiveness (The Experience of the Donetsk Region and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea)

The creation of permanent mobile groups within the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of Ukraine to monitor the observance of human rights and freedoms in the activities of internal affairs agencies has become a significant step in realising the concept of public oversight over law enforcement bodies. Mobile groups can also be perceived as a prototype of a future national mechanism for the prevention of torture, as this specific mechanism for public control over police activities can be considered a good example of an attempt by a state structure to be transparent to society. However, the activities of mobile groups, introduced at the initiative of the MIA leadership, appear as a "goodwill" gesture of the department in the absence of a corresponding law. This situation leads to the fact that, at the local level, the activities of mobile groups are not always properly supported, and therefore, in a specific region, the work of mobile groups significantly depends on the attitude of the local police leadership, which either facilitates the work of the mobile group or vice versa.
Currently, the activities of mobile groups are regulated solely by Order of the MIA of Ukraine No. 894 dated 31.06.2006 (as amended).
The powers, tasks, and functions of the mobile groups are contained in the relevant REGULATIONS approved by this Order. According to clause 6.2 of the Regulations, mobile groups perform oversight functions. The conclusions of the mobile groups, contained in monitoring reports, are of a recommendatory nature, and the information set out therein regarding violations of human and civil rights serves as a basis for mandatory official investigations.
In accordance with the REGULATIONS, the main tasks of the mobile groups include:
 Studying problems regarding the assurance of constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms by employees of internal affairs agencies in their operational and investigative activities.
 Informing the leadership of the MIA of Ukraine, the Main Directorates of the MIA, the Regional Directorates of the MIA, and transport units of the MIA covered by the monitoring about its results and identified violations.
 Developing methodological recommendations for internal affairs agencies aimed at preventing violations in their future operational and investigative activities.
 Bringing the results of the monitoring to the attention of the public through the media.
Therefore, mobile groups were created, primarily, for the purpose of monitoring the observance of human rights in the activities of internal affairs agencies and units of Ukraine, publicising the results of this external monitoring, and developing methodological recommendations for internal affairs agencies with the goal of preventing human rights violations in their future activities.
Despite considerable experience with monitoring visits in many regions of Ukraine, the activities of mobile groups as a form of public oversight do not fully realise the intent of such oversight, as experience has shown that the regulatory framework governing their work is quite imperfect.
In the activities of mobile groups, it is worth noting several points that are related to the direct implementation of the tasks of external public monitoring and are quite polemical in nature. Many operational issues, especially the limits of the competence of mobile group members, remain unambiguously undefined to this day.
A very important issue is the powers of the mobile groups after carrying out monitoring visits to internal affairs agencies or units. It is pertinent to note that usually, a visit to city or district police departments is perceived by their employees as just another, albeit quite specific, inspection. Therefore, the visits themselves are not seen as a sufficiently effective mechanism for protecting human rights; instead, it is necessary to combine the visit with additional monitoring of its results, namely monitoring how the heads of city and district departments and police directorates respond to the violations identified during the visits.
It should be emphasised that the powers of mobile group members to control the post-monitoring activities of Regional Directorates of the MIA are, unfortunately, not regulated by any normative document. This gives rise to many questions and difficulties that must be resolved by each specific mobile group in the regions. In particular: do members of a mobile group have the right to send requests to the MIA leadership asking for information regarding the results of investigations into violations identified by the mobile group members? Do the members have the right to evaluate the results of such investigations? Who should be the subject of such a request? How should they act in a case where there is no response to a request? The effectiveness and outcome of public monitoring depend on the resolution of these questions.
Another important issue is the relationship of mobile groups with structures outside the MIA. Can mobile group members report identified violations to other government structures, for example, the Prosecutor's Office? Order of the MIA of Ukraine No. 894-06 does not cover this issue. There is a viewpoint that, since mobile groups were created by the MIA itself, appeals by mobile group members to other departments, particularly the Prosecutor's Office, are inappropriate, unjustified, and to some extent, a violation of the "gentleman's agreement" between the public and internal affairs agencies, under which the police open up to the public, and in response, the public involved in the work of mobile groups should inform only representatives of the department about problems and human rights violations, even if they are brutal and serious. And what to do when, in this situation, the department, instead of an adequate reaction to the violations, begins to "save the perpetrators" of brutal violations? It seems that such a viewpoint illustrates a situation where, in exchange for admission to internal affairs agencies, the public must respond with almost unlimited loyalty to the activities of the police bodies. Is such an approach justified?
Also, an important point in the activities of mobile groups is the performance of one of their main functions – publicising the results of visits and bringing them to the attention of the public. Order of the MIA of Ukraine No. 894-06 does not provide a specific mechanism for this publication, other than the requirements regarding the "distribution of press releases, agreed upon by all members of the mobile groups." Considering that the idea of public oversight lies not only, and perhaps not so much, in attempts to look at the internal affairs system from the outside and provide recommendations to the police so that it changes for the better without public "exposure," but in something else—specifically in the fact that, "guided by high moral principles and giving priority to human rights compared to the interests of any person, organisation, party, or state institution," one should bring to the community information about the conditions in which citizens are kept in police facilities, about the working conditions of the police officers themselves, and contribute to improving the situation regarding the observance of human rights, even if this may cause unpleasant, but entirely justified, problems for some employees of the department.
It is necessary to develop a specific mechanism for the mandatory publication of the results of mobile group activities, which would take into account both the interests of the department and the interests of the society represented in the mobile groups by members of non-governmental organisations.
One of the important problems is the access of mobile group members to departmental normative documents that are directly related to monitoring activities and do not have restricted markings. As the experience of monitoring visits shows, a number of problems with human rights observance are generated precisely by the imperfection of normative documents, and even more so by the failure to comply with the provisions of these documents. But members of mobile groups can only detect violations of Instructions or Orders if they obtain the texts of these documents. What should representatives of the public who are members of mobile groups do when they are refused access to such documents without sufficient grounds?
Despite the mentioned difficulties, it can be stated that the activities of mobile groups monitoring the observance of human rights and freedoms in the activities of internal affairs agencies are already a fairly widespread, nationwide practice. During 2006–2008, mobile groups carried out more than 500 visits (85 of them in August 2008 alone) and inspected almost 100% of temporary detention facilities. Their work is established in all regions of Ukraine. During 2006–2008, a steady positive trend was observed in the annual increase in the number of monitoring visits: 86 in 2006, 145 in 2007, and 386 in 2008.
A number of issues regarding the activities of mobile groups remain unregulated, and these issues must be resolved without delay and without bias, adequately establishing priorities when a conflict arises between the interests of the department and the observance of human rights. This is the only path to increasing the effectiveness of public oversight in the work of internal affairs agencies.

O.P. BUKALOV, "Donetsk Memorial", member of the mobile group in the Donetsk region,
O.V. LUNOVA, "Crimean Centre for Social Protection 'Alpha'", coordinator of the mobile group of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Master of Philosophy