Russia’s penal labour traditions

The repressive nature of the penal system in Russia has deep roots. In the consciousness of prison guards, a total lack of respect for the personality of prisoners, a conviction in their lack of rights, and in their own impunity has been ingrained for centuries. The closed nature of the system has also contributed to this. When Chekhov travelled to Sakhalin at the beginning of the 20th century and described in detail the life of exiles and convicts, society shuddered. But little changed within the system itself. And later, in the Soviet era, its quality did not improve. A glimmer of hope appeared only in the early 1990s, when the democratisation of society began in Russia. At that time, human rights activists held state positions; Sergei Adamovich Kovalev became the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation was established, and human rights activists began visiting colonies, and what was happening there became widely known. Transparency is the main condition for improving the situation, as it provides the opportunity to quickly investigate any violation of the law.

The director of the penal system in those years was Yuri Ivanovich Kalinin—the very official who, under Putin, became the initiator of the tightening of the regime in colonies. It is easy to explain these metamorphoses: Kalinin always saluted—under Yeltsin and Kovalev, and under Putin.

When democratic norms began to be curtailed in the early 2000s, the security forces quickly sensed the signs of a changing political atmosphere and began to introduce new (or more accurately, old, traditional) orders into the penal system. What did we get in the 2000s? In fact, the same old GULAG—not Stalin’s, of course, but worse than Brezhnev’s: groundless arbitrariness and unjustifiably cruel treatment of prisoners.

What did the 'model' institutions of the FSIN (Federal Penitentiary Service) turn into? In fact, they became militarised camps where prisoners must carry out any command, including those not provided for by the Penal Enforcement Code. Humiliation awaits the prisoner at every step. For example, when greeting colony staff, they must take off their hat; if they hesitate, they risk being immediately sent to the punishment cell (SHIZO). They are forced to march and sing songs for hours, which, again, is not provided for by the Penal Enforcement Code. In some colonies, discipline requirements have been taken to the point of absurdity—traffic lights were installed so that prisoners walk on green in formation, like machines. All this is hidden from the public, but sometimes absurd nitpicking of those held in custody leaks into the media—this mainly happens when well-known people become objects of persecution (for example, Mikhail Trepashkin or Mikhail Khodorkovsky).

There are more than 700 colonies and several hundred pre-trial detention centres in Russia. They certainly have common problems—poor-quality medicine, violation of labour rights, poor sanitary-hygienic and living conditions, placement in the SHIZO on trumped-up grounds, the issue of re-socialising prisoners, and so on. But the most terrifying thing is that an entire system of violence has been built within the FSIN, which relies on the existence of torture zones (prisoners call them 'press zones'). Perhaps there are not that many of them (although we do not know how many), but they are quite sufficient for 'maintaining order', that is, for intimidation.

For example, if a prisoner who is in an ordinary colony writes complaints in accordance with the law or attempts to appeal against decisions in courts, they are told: 'If you don’t stop, we will send you to such-and-such a colony, and you understand yourself what will happen to you there.' And the prisoner knows perfectly well that they can be beaten, raped, humiliated, or even killed in a torture zone. Such a reputation does not exist without reason.

Until recently, violence in torture colonies relied to a significant extent on the activities of so-called Sections for Discipline and Order (SDP). In legislation, the SDP was listed as a voluntary association of prisoners, just like, say, a sports section. But the name itself suggests that whoever signs up for the SDP is prepared to cooperate with the administration, thereby opposing themselves to the prisoner community. A person possessing a sense of self-respect would refuse to join the SDP. In response, they could be beaten, put in a punishment cell, or humiliated in any way—for example, forced to clean a toilet filled with excrement with a toothbrush. We know all these facts from letters sent to the 'In Defence of Prisoners' Rights' Foundation.

I will cite the case of Maxim Gromov as an example. He is a supporter of Limonov and a former political prisoner. Having refused to sign up for the Section for Discipline and Order, he spent six months in an isolation cell. This is a flagrant violation of a prisoner’s rights; a court decision had ordered him to serve his sentence in a general regime colony.

In the Sections for Discipline and Order, the key role was played, of course, not by those who were forcibly pushed into them, but by those who went there voluntarily. These were mainly hardened criminals—paedophiles, rapists, and particularly bloodthirsty murderers. Fearing for their fate in the general colony, they willingly signed up for the SDP in order to be separated from the general mass, to have certain powers, and besides that—a real chance at early parole. The administration used them to keep an eye on prisoners, orchestrate provocations, beat others, and punish those they disliked. At the same time, SDP members not only voluntarily carried out the administration’s orders but also achieved their own goals—robbing prisoners and taking their parcels and money.

The activities of the SDP created an explosive atmosphere in the colonies. Prisoners might have tolerated violence on the part of the administration. But violence on the part of other convicts especially incensed them and provoked confrontation. Therefore, conflict situations, up to and including riots, were most often provoked precisely by the actions of members of the Sections for Discipline and Order.

And as a result, the penal system failed to cope with the main task it faces—the correction of criminals. Some prisoners, who received rewards for cruelty and violence, continued to do what they were used to in the 'zone' once they were free. Others, having encountered monstrous injustice and violence, were released embittered.

Now, by order of the Minister of Justice A. V. Konovalov, the Sections for Discipline and Order in the zones have been liquidated. I can say that this is an achievement of human rights activists who, for several years, persistently and consistently demanded their abolition. We were supported in this by state human rights defenders—the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation V. P. Lukin and E. A. Pamfilova, who heads the Council under the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights. Success was achieved by combining the efforts of independent human rights activists and state human rights institutions.

But it would be naive to assume that the FSIN will be transformed instantly, or that the system of violence will be destroyed and torture zones will disappear with the liquidation of the SDP. Humiliating loyalty tests are still applied in colonies. For example, the following: a prisoner is forced to wear a red armband, and if they refuse, they are made to clean the toilet with a toothbrush until they agree. If they refuse to clean the toilet, the prisoner is subjected to a beating. Often, after beating the prisoner, the execution of the recalcitrant continues. Those who refuse to carry out unlawful instructions and have withstood the beatings are then subjected to even more sophisticated mockery. For example, they are threatened that they will be forcibly plunged head-first into a toilet, with this moment being captured on a mobile phone camera, and then these photos will be distributed among prisoners for the purpose of compromising them. Most often, this occurs during quarantine and in transit camps when prisoners are being transported via 'etap'. Such coercion toward unconditional obedience to the administration effectively replaces the sign-up for the Section for Discipline and Order. It was precisely such humiliations that prisoners were subjected to in the transit prison of the city of Kopeysk, Chelyabinsk region, in 2008. Four prisoners who did not submit to the unlawful demands were beaten to such an extent that they died from pain shock. At the moment, a criminal case has been opened and several colony administration employees have been arrested. The head of the local GUFSIN (Main Directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service) has also been removed from his post and is under investigation.

The inclination toward cruelty can be traced in the activities of the security forces and in the moods of society, and it is further reinforced by traditions. A striking example is Mordovia. In those parts, the primary profession is prison guard; it is passed down in families from generation to generation. And along with it, notions about how to treat prisoners are passed down—the conviction that they are trash, not people.

In order to eradicate the possibility of such incidents, it is necessary to check the entire senior personnel of FSIN institutions with the participation of independent psychologists. As long as this does not happen, it will not be possible to eradicate violence: a criminal order for mockery, humiliation, and beatings will be given not to a member of the SDP, but to a member of a voluntary section with a different name, for example, a fire brigade, or to some brute working in a cushy job.

Has the FSIN reform begun?

Recently, the director of the FSIN, A. A. Reimer, and the Minister of Justice, A. V. Konovalov, announced the beginning of a large-scale reform of the penal system, calculated for a long term—until 2020. The goal of the reform, judging by the statements of officials in the media, is to bring the activities of the penal system closer to international standards and the needs of social development. It sounds nice. But why was the reform announced as a fait accompli? Why were qualified experts, human rights activists, and, finally, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation not involved in its development? After all, it is dangerous to adopt such large-scale transformations in the penal system without serious discussion with various specialists. In the opinion of human rights activists, some of the stated provisions of the reform may not improve, but rather worsen, the situation with prisoners' rights.

What is the essence of our objections?

It was announced that colonies would cease to exist and be replaced by prisons—in accordance with Western standards.

In Russia, a specific camp subculture has formed over the centuries, in accordance with which prisoners live and survive in the colonies. Is it necessary to break it? Will this lead to the improvement and stabilisation of the situation within the FSIN? Perhaps it is more reasonable to do something else—to use what has already taken shape? The subculture regulates the shared life of prisoners, but this does not mean it is necessarily aimed at resistance. It could be oriented towards the socialisation of prisoners to prepare people for life after release, to reduce the number of recidivists.

If the people who are famous for their cruelty in colony administrations work in prisons, we will get a tightening of conditions instead of a humanisation of the lives of prisoners. One of the important arguments in favour of colonies is that everything here is visible, and when something extraordinary happens, it is impossible to hide the incident. It becomes known to relatives and human rights activists. If prisoners are separated from one another and remain at the mercy of guards prone to sadism, it will be significantly easier to hide human rights violations. It is not excluded that, as a result of a hastily conducted reform, places of confinement will turn into continuous SHIZOs (punishment cells). There will be a tightening of punishment, and this is forbidden by the Constitution.

Prison reform, proceeding under the banner of humanisation, assumes an increase in the role of suspended sentences and the number of settlement-colonies. A suspended sentence is, in essence, a warning about what awaits a person if they violate the law again. While they remain free, they are allowed to live anywhere in Russia and even travel abroad. A settlement-colony also assumes the presence of certain freedoms. It would seem that proposals to increase such lighter punishments lead to progress. But even here, doubts arise. The fact is that the modern Russian judicial system is distinguished by extreme repressiveness. And our entire society is not ready for the softening of punishments; on the contrary, it is inclined toward their tightening, even up to the introduction of the death penalty. In these conditions, one cannot hope for humanisation. Rather, it should be expected that courts will begin to award house arrest or a term in a settlement-colony instead of a suspended sentence, and a prison term, even if short, instead of a settlement-colony. A great deal of work is needed with judges and with society. The media must explain to people that the main thing is not the tightening of punishments, but their inevitability. In addition, oversight of the execution of punishments by society is necessary.

When human rights activists expressed concern over the fact that the reform of the penal system had not yet been discussed with them, the leaders of the FSIN replied that all this was still to come. This turned out to be a lie. We learned about the start of the reform from a sharp increase in complaints from prisoners to our organisations regarding facts of beatings and torture. It turned out that an order had been issued by the FSIN according to which the separation of the colony contingent into two categories had begun—those serving time for the first time ('first-timers') and those who had been convicted not for the first time. Colony heads, executing the order of high-ranking superiors, began to rip 'first-timers' out of the environment they had already settled into and send them to zones often located far from home (for example, from Rostov to Kemerovo). Judging by the complaints, it is precisely these 'first-timers', to whom humanity is supposedly being shown, who are regularly beaten during 'etap' (transport) and during their 'registration' in the new colony.

If one looks at this situation based on the provisions of the Penal Enforcement Code, the transfer of convicts from one correctional institution to another must be recognised as illegal. According to Part 2 of Article 81 of the Penal Enforcement Code of the Russian Federation, the transfer of a convict for further service of a sentence from one colony to another of the same type, or from one prison to another, is permitted only in the case of a convict’s illness, for the sake of ensuring their personal safety, or during the reorganisation or liquidation of a correctional institution, or under other exceptional circumstances that prevent the convict from remaining in the given correctional institution.

It seems rational that the separation of convicts into 'first-timers' and persons who have already served sentences should only apply to those who are being sent to places of deprivation of liberty for the first time by a court decision. And those who are already serving a sentence should remain where they were assigned before the reform.

Public oversight

Two years ago, the law on public oversight of the penal system finally started working. Human rights activists fought for ten years for the adoption of this law and prepared its draft, which was subsequently significantly distorted. For example, our draft stated that observers could come to a colony unexpectedly; the law, however, states: one must warn about their visit in advance. This changes the situation at its root: upon learning of an upcoming visit, the administration manages to hide the victims and move them to another colony.

As for the Public Oversight Commissions (ONK), we assumed that their composition would be approved by the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. However, the State Duma entrusted this to the Civic Chamber, and the result was pathetic. The forces were distributed roughly as follows: one-third of the list of public observers consists of human rights activists, the second third consists of those who, in any situation, will defend the penal system (the FSIN introduced its own people there through various kinds of public organisations), and another third consists of inert executors.

The activity of the ONK suffers not only because there are insufficient human rights activists in their composition. The work of public observers is hampered in every possible way by representatives of colony administrations, who exert maximum pressure on the wards. Working on prisoners' complaints is very difficult because they are entirely dependent on the jailers. Arriving with an inspection based on a complaint, observers might hear: 'I am renouncing my statement; I was in the wrong.' At the same time, the Foundation has in its possession written appeals in which the reason for these sudden renunciations of stated claims is revealed. For example, a prisoner from Kemerovo IK-40 reports directly to us: 'In the event of my written renunciation of complaints and appeals, I ask that this renunciation be considered false, as I (full name) officially declare that I am not renouncing my appeals and complaints. If there is any renunciation or withdrawal, this will mean confirmation of the fact of pressure, physical violence, and all sorts of torture by the administration or their subordinate 'activists' carrying out the administration’s orders.'

But, be that as it may, the adoption of the law on public oversight, even in a truncated form, is a great achievement for human rights activists, civil society, and state human rights institutions. It is a rare example of the fact that changes in the direction of human rights can occur in Russia.

It is obvious that the penal system can only be improved if the complaints of prisoners and the facts of abuse established by members of the ONK and human rights activists are objectively examined by the authorities. However, at present, we most often receive boilerplate responses from local prosecutors of the type: 'Inspection conducted. The facts were not confirmed.' And only after appeals to the General Prosecutor’s Office, and as a rule, repeated ones, do we achieve investigations regarding the crimes we reported. The ratio is roughly this: out of every five inquiries, only one is considered on its merits. And I will show what happens when complaints from prisoners are treated with neglect with a fresh example.

In December 2009, the head of the Bashkir branch of the All-Russian Public Movement 'For Human Rights', L. Chernov, sent a statement to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bashkortostan regarding the violation of the rights of prisoners held in IZ-3/1 of the GUFSIN, who complained about poor medical care and intentional damage to products during the inspection of parcels and transfers. From the prosecutor’s office response of 27 January 2010, it was clear that the facts of the violations were not confirmed. Literally a week later, on 6 February 2010, mass unrest occurred in IZ-3/1. The main cause of the unrest was the prisoners' disagreement with the procedure for inspecting parcels and transfers, during which food and cigarettes were rendered completely unusable. The prisoners' riot was brutally suppressed. At the present time, an inspection is being conducted regarding the fact of the disorganisation of the activities of FBU IZ-3/1 in relation to the riot participants. However, there are real fears that the inspection will concern only the consequences of what happened (the riot participants will be charged), while the reasons that prompted the convicts to take extreme measures will again remain without proper consideration.





Black holes of the penal system
It is clear that as of yet, there are no ideal colonies in our country and there cannot be. Exceeding authority on the part of the administration, lack of qualified medical aid, poor nutrition, lack of conditions for work activity, unfair remuneration for labour—all these are chronic problems of the colonies. But one can hope that these problems will be solved if they become known, that is, if the prisoners' complaints leave the colony.

The situation is much worse in those zones from which complaints do not arrive at all. This means that prisoners are denied such an opportunity altogether.

In physics, there is such a concept—black holes. Their existence is known only by indirect signs. They send no information about themselves into the outside world; at any rate, modern science cannot receive such signals.

Colonies from which no complaints arrive are the same 'black holes'. They are completely closed to the public. When members of the ONK come to such colonies, they are forced to state total well-being: prisoners stand at attention and say they have no problems. Only human rights organisations manage to uncover violations in such colonies, relying on reports from relatives, former prisoners, and also by responding to mobile calls from the colonies. In cases of extreme necessity, prisoners use mobile phones, although they are prohibited in colonies. By the way, why not allow people serving time to use landline telephones at their own expense without restriction, under the supervision of the administration? Such a practice exists in some countries.

In these cases, it is even harder to achieve an investigation of the situation by the local prosecutor’s office than when there is a concrete prisoner complaint. As an example, I will cite colony IK-5 of the Kemerovo region. We received many unofficial reports about violations in this zone, although we know for certain that some convicts officially appealed to us, passing their letters through the colony’s special department, as is required by law; however, not a single letter reached us. In particular, we were also informed about the murder of a prisoner. Having checked this data and ensured their consistency, we appealed to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Kemerovo region with a proposal to interview specific prisoners. However, the prosecutor’s office staff interviewed not those whom we asked, and refused to initiate a criminal case. Having spent several months on correspondence, we, in the end, achieved a prosecutor’s inspection. The latest communication from the prosecutor’s office indicated that the cause of death was, allegedly, a scuffle with cellmates, as a result of which 20-year-old Sevostyanov Artem died after hitting his head on the floor. Moreover, earlier in 2005, in the same IK-5, another prisoner, Eremenko, died for refusing to 'work' in the SDP; according to the version of FSIN employees, he fell down the stairs.

And quite recently, on 5 April 2010, we learned about another mysterious 'fall down the stairs' in IK-5. Fortunately, this time the victim, Agibalov, remained alive and is in a prison hospital.

To our great regret, the administration’s abuses are also abetted by the medical personnel of this institution. Instead of recording clear signs of beatings in the convicts' medical files and issuing them certificates to this effect, the medics recommend that prisoners not appeal to them, motivating this by saying that they expose themselves to even harsher repressions, transfer to the PKT (Cell-type premise), or transfer to a 'torture' zone.

There are quite a few of such 'black holes', according to our observations, and they are surely listed in FSIN documents as model zones.

Conclusions

The started reform of the penal system, accompanied by the grossest violations of human rights, must be stopped. As the above-cited examples showed, under existing circumstances, the goals of the reform cannot be achieved.

Civil society institutions, and primarily human rights activists, must be maximally involved in the development and implementation of the reform.

What must be done in the first instance?

Since there are many legally illiterate, morally and mentally unstable people in the ranks of the penal system staff, employees of correctional institutions (and first and foremost—the leadership) must undergo a psychological examination, which should be entrusted not to FSIN employees, but to independent specialists. Based on the results of the selection and examinations, all those employees who subjected prisoners to violence and humiliation must be dismissed, and criminal cases must be initiated against them.

How the reform will proceed in our country depends not only on the leadership of the FSIN but also on the overall policy in the country. The tightening of the penal system began from the 2000s. Under Putin, the FSIN turned into a totalitarian enclave. A second such enclave is Chechnya. And if real changes in the direction of democratisation of the regime do not occur in the country, the authorities may sooner or later slide into such methods. The train is standing on the reserve track—the prisons are ready to accept anyone; they are capable of grinding everyone down. Everything converges here—both politics and traditions.

The author is the Executive Director of the All-Russian Public Movement 'For Human Rights', Deputy Chairman of the Board of the 'For Prisoners' Rights' Foundation.


Brief summary: violence, torture, and protest actions in places of deprivation of liberty

(January – March 2010)

1. Republic of Bashkortostan, IZ-3/1 (February 2010)

On 6 February 2010, a prisoners' riot was suppressed in IZ-3. The main cause of the unrest was the prisoners' disagreement with the procedure for inspecting parcels and transfers, during which food and cigarettes were rendered completely unusable.

Note: the prisoners' riot was brutally suppressed. At the present time, an inspection is being conducted regarding the fact of the disorganisation of the activities of FBU IZ-3/1 in relation to the riot participants. However, there are real fears that the inspection will concern only the consequences of what happened (the riot participants will be charged), while the reasons that prompted the convicts to take extreme measures will again remain without proper consideration.

2. Nizhny Novgorod region, IZ-52/2 (February 2010)

On 18 February, 7 prisoners of the pre-trial detention centre declared a hunger strike. The cause of the protest action was the prisoners' dissatisfaction with the conditions of detention in the SIZO (pre-trial detention centre).

Note: the prosecutor’s inspection conducted recognised the prisoners' claims as unfounded.

3. Republic of Karelia, pos. Nadvoitsy, IK-1 (February 2010)

In February, a complaint was received by the Foundation from the spouse of a convict that physical force and torture were being systematically applied to her husband in IK-1: bleach was sprayed in his cell; he was placed in a 'stretch' (a body position where the arms and legs must be spread as wide as possible to the sides) for a prolonged period of time. In the end, unable to withstand the sophisticated mockery, the prisoner inflicted bodily harm upon himself in the form of incised wounds to the forearms. He did not receive any medical aid.

Note: the prosecutor’s and departmental inspections conducted did not establish violations of the convict’s rights.

4. Kirov region, pos. Vostochny, IK-6 (February 2010)

In February, information was received by the Foundation that physical force and special equipment were being repeatedly and intentionally applied to newly arrived convicts in IK-6 (in connection with the ongoing reform—the separation of the contingent of prisons and colonies) without lawful grounds; furthermore, convicts were threatened with rape and reprisal in the event they appealed with complaints to government bodies and the prosecutor’s office.

Note: the Foundation sent appeals to the Public Oversight Commission, the prosecutor’s office, the investigation department, the UFSSIN of the Kirov region, and the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. According to the responses from the UFSSIN and the prosecutor’s office, no violations of the convicts' rights were established during the inspections.

5. Kemerovo region, IK-5, IK-12, IK-40 (February 2010)

In February, information was received by the Foundation that physical force was being repeatedly and intentionally applied to newly arrived convicts in IK-5, IK-12, and IK-40 without lawful grounds, and the convict Sevostyanov A. O. had died.

Note: the Foundation sent appeals to the prosecutor’s office, the GUFSIN of the Kemerovo region, and the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. At the present time, a criminal case has been opened regarding the fact of abuse of office, and in relation to the identified violations, a representation was submitted to the head of IK-12; the guilty employees were held to disciplinary account, including three people dismissed from the Penal Enforcement System. A criminal case has been opened regarding the fact of the death of convict A. O. Sevostyanov.

6. Chelyabinsk region, city of Verkhneuralsk, T-1 (prison) (January–March 2010)

In the period from January to March, numerous complaints were received by the Foundation regarding violations of the rights of convicts in T-1 (violence, poor nutrition, improper sanitary-hygienic and living conditions, etc.).

Note: the Foundation sent appeals to the GUFSIN and the prosecutor’s office of the Chelyabinsk region and the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation.

The inspection conducted by the prosecutor’s office, unlike the GUFSIN, revealed violations of the convicts' rights, in connection with which a representation was submitted to T-1. An appeal regarding the application of physical violence against the convict Makarov is being considered by the investigation department.

7. Tver region, city of Tver, IZ-69/1

In March, a complaint was received by the Foundation that convicts travelling via 'etap' through IZ-69/1 in the city of Tver are systematically subjected to physical violence on the part of the detention centre’s employees.

Note: appeals were sent by the Foundation to the prosecutor’s office and the UFSSIN of the Tver region. No response has been received.

8. Saratov region, city of Engels, IK-13 (April 2010)

In April, information was received by the Foundation that, during a conducted search, about 35 convicts held in the cell-type premise (PKT) of IK-13 were subjected to beatings. Attempting to stop the violence, the convicts inflicted bodily harm upon themselves.

Note: appeals were immediately sent by the Foundation to the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation, the FSIN of Russia, the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, and the prosecutor and head of the GUFSIN for the Saratov region.