Crime as a Factor in Political Competition

Media reports on crimes—armed robberies, thefts, murders—have become quite mundane, and claims about an incredible rise in crime are circulating in the public space; this does not even require proof. Respectable persons sometimes reinforce their words with descriptions of individual horrific crimes, avoiding the citation of statistical data.

Of course, every crime is someone’s suffering, pain, broken destiny, and sometimes a lost life. But every individual crime, no matter how horrific or even bloody it may be, does not yet reflect the general trends in the criminogenic situation. Breivik’s murder of over 70 people in Norway a few years ago still leaves the country among those where the crime rate is quite low, and therefore life is safe.

Information about crimes committed is often presented in the context of the “Savchenko Law” and is accompanied by two main messages:

a) crime in the country is constantly growing;

b) crimes are often committed by persons who were released from prisons under the “Savchenko Law”.

The construction of such reports implies (by default) a conclusion that is entirely logical for a normal person: if not for the “Savchenko Law”, there would not be so many criminals, particularly murderers, at large, and life would be safer. Some politicians, and with their prompting, many media outlets, promote the perception of the law as one that is beneficial only to criminals, while being harmful to society and citizens. Consequently, it must be urgently repealed to stop the release of criminals under the “Savchenko Law” and to curb the growth of crime, making life safer.

Particularly inadequate individuals place the responsibility for the implementation of the law on Savchenko herself—contrary to common sense, ignoring the fact that she did not personally vote for this law, while some of the law’s critics did.

To what extent do these described logical constructs correspond to reality?

The human rights organization “Donetsk Memorial” decided to see for itself the veracity of the sensational statements about an astronomical crime rate. To this end, it resorted to a proven method—it sent requests to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, which kindly provided data on registered crimes of certain categories for 2014–2016, as well as on the number of persons convicted for such crimes during this period.

We invite you to carefully examine the data received.

We are aware that the number of actual crimes is always higher than the number of registered ones, but for the beginning of the analysis, we assume that the percentage (share) of those crimes that are registered does not change much from year to year. We will discuss the realism of this assumption a little later. For now, let us analyze the trends in the number of crimes based on the official data provided by the respected agencies.

Let us first consider the statistical data on the number of crimes committed (see Table 1), and then on the number of convicted criminals (see Table 2).

Table 1

Thefts.

They were registered annually (by year): 226,833 (2014) – 273,756 (2015) – 312,172 (2016).

Thus, there is a steady growth in registered thefts; moreover, in the last year, 14% more were registered than in the previous year, and compared to 2014, this growth is +38%.

Robberies.

They were registered annually (by year): 20,541 (2014) – 22,108 (2015) – 27,199 (2016). These crimes also increased in 2016 by +23%, and compared to 2014, this growth is +32% overall.

Armed robberies.

Over the last three years, the following number of crimes in this category was registered annually:

3,895 (2014) – 3,556 (2015) – 3,904 (2016).

It is obvious that in 2016 there was a certain increase in registered armed robberies, and in the last year, 10% more were registered than in the previous year, although compared to 2014, this growth is almost imperceptible—0.2%.

Murders.

As follows from the table data, their number in 2014–2016 changed as follows:

4,920 (2014) – 3,226 (2015) – 1,824 (2016). That is, in 2016, when “hundreds of people convicted of murder” had supposedly been released from prisons and the “Savchenko Law” had been applied to them, 43% fewer murders were registered than a year earlier, when the “Savchenko Law” was not yet in effect, and 2.7 times fewer than the year before that.

Intentional grievous bodily harm.

The table data show that their number in 2014–2016 changed as follows:

3,132 (2014) – 2,511 (2015) – 2,256 (2016). That is, in 2016, cases of intentional grievous bodily harm were registered 10% less than a year earlier and 28% less than the year before that.

It is worth noting that the table provided contains another very interesting indicator—the number of identified persons who committed certain criminal offences. It is worth paying attention not to the indicators themselves, but to their dynamics, the change in their ratio to the number of registered relevant crimes.

For example, if, with 273,756 thefts registered in 2015, the number of identified persons who committed thefts was 49,089, then with an increase in such crimes in 2016 to 312,172, the number of identified persons who committed them decreased to 41,940. That is, in a year, the number of crimes increased by 14%, while the number of identified criminals decreased by 14.6%.

A similar situation exists regarding robberies. With 22,108 robberies registered in 2015, the number of identified persons who committed robberies was 6,040. With an increase in the number of such crimes in 2016 to 27,199 (an increase of 23%), the number of identified persons who committed them decreased to 5,618, or by 7%.

The ratio of the number of crimes to the number of identified persons for intentional grievous bodily harm has practically not changed over the last two years. For murders, the trend in this ratio is significantly positive: with their decrease by 43%, the number of identified persons who committed them decreased by only 9%.

The statistical data presented require professional analysis. We do not have enough information for definitive conclusions regarding the causes of such a situation. Experts, preferably qualified and impartial, should interpret them more reasonably. In this matter, we can only express assumptions. For example, the following: thieves and robbers were caught in 2016 worse than in 2015. It is not surprising that if more of them remain at large, they have the opportunity to continue stealing and robbing.

One cannot help but mention such alarming considerations: it is possible that in 2016, the real number of some crimes—armed robberies, thefts—increased more than the statistics reflect.

Also important is this consideration: our assumption about the stability of the share of crimes that are registered annually out of their total number may be incorrect. In fact, it may happen that due to the deterioration of crime accounting, statistical data will indicate a slight increase or even a decrease, while in reality, the number of certain crimes may actually be increasing significantly. We do not know if such an effect exists for the data provided. But if such an effect exists, it means that the structure responsible for accounting (registration) of crimes has significantly deteriorated (“tenfold”?) the quality of its work. But such a circumstance certainly has nothing to do with the application of the “Savchenko Law”. Furthermore, if statistical data distort the real picture regarding the growth of crime, where can other, more accurate, so to speak, “real” data come from?

Conclusions:

In 2016, the number of registered thefts, robberies, and armed robberies increased by 10–23%. To call such growth catastrophic (“frenetic,” “tenfold”...) is, to put it mildly, incorrect. But this assertion may be valid provided that there has not been a significant deterioration in the registration of crimes.

It is also worth emphasizing that the table presents data for the entire country.

At the same time, it is quite likely that crime growth in different regions may differ significantly from the national average. For example, this growth in the capital may be higher than the average level, and in other regions—the opposite.

No less interesting are the statistical data on the number of persons convicted over the last three years for certain crimes. These data are presented in Table 2. And although it should be understood that the conviction of criminals takes place some time after their detention (and therefore after the registration of their crimes), one can still qualitatively understand the picture regarding the change in the level of, so to speak, the “convictability” of persons.

Table 2

Thus, the number of persons convicted for thefts in the last three years changed as follows:

38,636 (2014) – 41,150 (2015) – 34,470 (2016). That is, this level is decreasing: in 2016, 16% fewer people were convicted for theft than in 2015 and 11% fewer than in 2014.

Robberies.

The dynamics of convictions for robbery are as follows: 5,297 (2014) – 4,789 (2015) – 4,131 (2016). The level of conviction for robbery in 2016 is 14% less than the 2015 level and 22% less than the 2014 level.

Armed robberies.

The situation is similar regarding convictions for armed robbery: 1,286 (2014) – 1,008 (2015) – 893 (2016).

That is, the level of conviction for armed robbery is also steadily decreasing: in 2016, 11% fewer people were convicted for armed robbery than in 2015 and 31% fewer than in 2014.

The situation does not change the trend even with the number of persons convicted in the last three years for intentional grievous bodily harm: 1,879 (2014) – 1,657 (2015) – 1,371 (2016). Thus, in 2016, 17% fewer people were convicted for these crimes than in 2015 and 27% fewer than in 2014.

Intentional murders.

Regarding intentional murders—the same: 951 (2014) – 827 (2015) – 658 (2016). And here, in 2016, 20% fewer people were convicted than in 2015 and 31% fewer than in 2014.

Conclusion. The number of persons convicted for serious crimes over the last three years has steadily and stably decreased by an amount ranging from 11% to 31%. Given the above, it is difficult to understand how the data presented correlates with the confidence of both the media and politicians about an incredible increase in crime?

We see two ways of explaining the situation: either there are greatly exaggerated ideas about the real state of the crime rate, and in reality, the situation is much safer than some politicians and officials paint (scare!).

Or, the real increase in the number of crimes is noticeably larger than follows from the official statistical data, and this can only happen if the level of recording crimes (their registration) has significantly (and perhaps very significantly) deteriorated. Then the causes of this deterioration must be identified and named. But these are certainly not the norms of the “Savchenko Law,” which our parliamentarians are trying to change in order to influence the “frenetic increase in the crime rate.”

Summary. It is necessary to fight crime, but a positive result can only be achieved provided there is an adequate reflection of the real situation and the diagnosis of the true causes of the phenomena under study. Transforming the resolution of serious social problems into mechanisms of political competition will hardly help in achieving results useful for citizens.