What is expected from the dual system of inspecting places of deprivation of liberty?
In 2021, Draft Bill No. 5884 on the establishment of a system of regular penitentiary inspections was rejected, leaving prosecutorial supervision as almost the sole mechanism for monitoring places of deprivation of liberty. Recently, the Verkhovna Rada resumed its consideration of this issue, registering Draft Bill No. 15300 of 8 June 2026. Although the establishment of a dual inspection system is provided for by the Constitution and is essential to address structural problems in the penitentiary sector, the new initiative is once again being introduced in haste and without proper conceptualisation.
We see a number of systemic flaws in the draft bill. The main one is the lack of a clear definition of the core purpose of these inspections. It remains unclear from the text whether they will become an instrument of strict supervision with binding response measures (similar to prosecutorial supervision) or whether they are being introduced as a tool to support and guide the operations of institutional administrations. Without resolving this issue, it is impossible to formulate effective legislative provisions. Instead, the proposed system is actually geared towards curtailing the openness of these institutions and turning them into entities fully controlled by state law enforcement and security agencies.
It is proposed to entrust administrative inspections to law enforcement and security agencies (the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the National Police, the State Criminal Executive Service (DKVS), etc.), which themselves employ coercive measures. Combining operational-investigative and supervisory powers creates a serious conflict of interest, poses a risk of abuse, and contradicts the Mandela Rules and other international standards. Furthermore, civil society representatives are completely excluded from these inspections, rendering the process of public oversight closed-door and non-transparent.
External inspection is largely equated with the functions of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM). The draft bill fails to distinguish between these institutions, creating artificial competition within a single body. This lack of differentiation reduces external inspection to a purely preventive activity, whose findings will take the form of non-binding suggestions rather than demands to remedy violations, thereby casting doubt on its effectiveness.
The draft contains no procedural guarantees for implementing the results of inspections: there are no set deadlines for compiling reports, and administrations are under no obligation to respond to detected violations in a timely manner. To ensure the system’s effectiveness, the future law must clearly distinguish between the inspections and the NPM, provide for public involvement, establish consequences for non-compliance with recommendations, and coordinate efforts with the entities authorized to conduct visits under Article 24 of the Criminal Executive Code.